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ABSTRACT 
The use of virtualized servers is on the rise.  This results in a need for better forensic 
analysis capabilities for these virtualized environments.  One of the answers to that has 
been the development of virtual machine introspection tools.  Virtual machine 
introspection is a relatively new technique that has some important implications for 
digital forensics.  Since it is performed outside of the virtual machine, it can help to 
alleviate the observer effect that is often encountered when performing a live analysis.  
This thesis tests how these tools can work in a nonquiescent environment and shows that 
the tools tested are able to produce reliable results.   
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I. INTRODUCTION  
A. INTRODUCTION 
The recent growth of virtualization and cloud computing has created the need for 
a new generation of incident response and forensics analysis tools capable of operating 
effectively in these new environments.  Investigators require forensically sound tools and 
techniques that have been validated to yield correct results while minimizing their impact 
on the systems being investigated.   
Many data centers are moving to virtualized servers and platforms.  Since most 
incident response and investigations occur in data centers, it makes sense that with this 
trend, responders and digital forensic investigators will increasingly be required to work 
with virtual environments.  In fact, many books and papers now cover the new challenges 
that virtualization presents to the forensics process [1], [2], [3].  Virtualization affords the 
opportunity for multiple virtualized instances to reside on a single physical machine.  
Each of these instances remains logically separated from the other but intermixed 
physically.  One area of concern is the potential to escape from a virtual machine and 
break the logical separation between the machines allowing the possibility for breaking 
into other virtual machines residing on the same physical host.  Even without the issue of 
breaking into another machine, performing forensics on a machine hosting multiple 
virtual machines raises a number of issues.   
This thesis will investigate the utility of Virtual Machine Introspection (VMI), 
specifically if XenAccess, developed by Bryan Payne [4], will work on a nonquiescent 
virtual machine.  By nonquiescent we mean an active virtual machine.  This is as opposed 
to a paused virtual machine that much research so far has focused on.  When forensic 
investigators are examining a new virtual machine where an incident may have taken 
place, it is important for them to know how reliable the tools that they are working with 
are.  This thesis will perform some tests of selected virtual machine introspection tools on 
a nonquiescent virtual machine and compare the results with those obtained from a 
paused virtual machine to see how reliable the results they produce are.   
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Virtual Machine Introspection is an important new area of research.  It can help to 
solve the problem of the observer effect in digital forensics.  When an investigator 
examines a running machine, they will change the state of the machine simply because 
they are loading tools into that machine’s memory in order to examine it, but with VMI 
the tools are executed outside of the virtual machine and therefore do not impact the 
memory of the virtual machine being investigated.  With this development, the state of 
the art with virtual machine forensics is advancing.  
B. ORGANIZATION OF THESIS 
This thesis is organized into five chapters.  The first is an introduction to the 
subject.  The second chapter explores the background information necessary to 
understand the digital forensics process.  The third explains the experimental 
environment and the methodology used in evaluating virtual machine introspection tools.  
The fourth details the results from the experiments and gives a conclusion for the thesis.  
Finally the fifth chapter highlights some related and future work.   
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II. BACKGROUND INFORMATION 
This thesis will explore areas that require some background before we begin.  The 
areas that will be covered briefly are: digital forensics, virtualization and virtual machine 
introspection.   
A. DIGITAL FORENSICS 
Digital forensics may be defined in many different ways, often depending on the 
source of the definition and the context in which forensics is being performed [5], [6].  
Some definitions focus on observing state information of a system to gain a better picture 
of what is happening on that system.  More traditional definitions will say that forensics 
deals with the handling of legal evidence; although, the techniques and applications from 
digital forensics are quite often applied outside of the legal setting.  Digital forensics 
emerged from the field of forensic science, which has to do with secure handling of 
evidence, usually for a legal setting.  The field of forensics needs to be very exact, since 
the evidence that is collected may be used to prosecute and possibly incriminate 
someone.  Digital forensics focuses on obtaining and analyzing digital information for 
criminal, civil, and administrative cases [6].   
Digital forensic investigators focus their efforts on the collection and analysis of 
electronic evidence.  Often, this involves the collection and analysis of drive images (bit 
for bit copies of the contents of a storage device), as well as the collection and analysis of 
data collected from a running computer.  There are many challenges that this presents, 
one of the biggest is to preserve the integrity of the data on the machine and collecting 
that data in a secure and reliable way.  Information in a computer system is composed of 
binary data and the interpretation of that data may change based on the context in which 
it is interpreted.  The forensic examiner needs to provide assurance that the data is 
interpreted in the same way as it would be interpreted on the machine being investigated.  
Examiners also need to provide some assurance that the data presented are the same as 
the data that were originally collected from the machine, which is often performed by 
computing a cryptographic hash of the data, both as the data is originally collected, and 
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again after analyzing the data. This allows for detection of any changes that may have 
occurred within the data.  The forensic examiner should strive to capture the state of the 
system as close to the time of the incident of interest as possible. The state of the machine 
is defined as everything that is happening in the machine, from the registers to the 
memory to the hard drive [7].  The examiner needs to collect as much of this state as 
possible.  Ideally, the examiner wants to build a timeline of events that could have 
created that state, and then find the evidence that supports or refutes that timeline.  Once 
a timeline is established, the examiner may use the evidence to demonstrate what is likely 
to have caused those events.  This thesis is concerned with the forensically sound 
collection of evidence that accurately reflects the state of the system being investigated. 
There are two schools of thought when it comes to performing forensics on a 
machine.  One is to perform what is referred to as live analysis, examining running 
processes, open files, network connections, and the contents of RAM to obtain as much 
pertinent data as possible, including volatile information, on what is currently happening 
on the system, preferably as close to the time of the incident as possible.  However, this 
method generally changes the state of the machine that is being analyzed because each 
action carried out by the forensic examiner typically requires the execution of new 
programs that often modify (generally appending to) log data, create and delete 
temporary files, etc. [1].  This is known as the observer effect, as the examiner observes 
the data they are also changing the state of the system.  The observer effect can be 
worsened by the presence of malicious software, in which case the compromised machine 
cannot even be trusted to accurately reveal its state.  This concept is similar to one from 
the field of quantum mechanics that is known as the Heisenberg uncertainty principle; 
where the act of measuring a particle changes the state of the particle and introduces 
uncertainty [8].   
The other school of thought is that to preserve the data as close to the original 
state as possible, the machine should be shut off immediately and the examiner should 
only use available nonvolatile data during the analysis of the system.  Many times this 
nonvolatile data can be enough to show what has happened on the machine.   However, it 
will never give a complete picture of the machine state.  When forensics is being 
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performed on a virtualized computer system, virtual machine introspection (VMI) can 
help to eliminate the observer effect by leveraging the power of the virtual machine 
monitor (virtual machine host) to gather required information from outside the virtual 
machine instance.   
The value of live analysis is that the investigator can gain an insight into what is 
actually taking place in the system.  They can run tools like ps, which provides a list of 
all currently running processes, or lsof, which provides a list of all files currently in use 
on the system.  This and other data may provide important clues to the investigator and 
may possibly reveal the network connection an attacker has used to exploit the system or 
which files a user was viewing which could point to the motivation for the incident.  
Collecting an image of RAM will provide a more complete vision of what is going on in 
the computer.  There are many tools that are designed to facilitate the analysis of RAM 
images such as Volatility [9] and IDETECT [10].  Given a RAM image alone, it is often 
possible to obtain a list of running processes, logged in users, as well as additional 
information about the running system.   
B. VIRTUALIZATION 
Virtualization is not new, but it has recently become more popular.  In the late 
1960s, mainframe computers were virtualized and rented out to smaller companies that 
could not afford an actual mainframe as a cost effective solution.  It was impractical for 
many small companies to buy an expensive mainframe computer, but they still needed to 
use them, so other companies would create a virtual mainframe that they could rent out to 
the smaller companies for much cheaper than the cost of a full mainframe.  In the 1980s 
and 1990s, with the advent of the personal computer (PC) and the drop in hardware costs, 
virtualization lost steam [11]. Recently however, virtualization has grown in popularity 
again, and desktop and server virtualization are common to see in organizations.  
Companies, such as VMware, have made virtualization a mainstream capability.  Since 
VMware figured out how to do direct binary translation for x86 instructions which was 
previously thought to be impossible, virtual machines (VM) have appeared in more and 
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 more places [12].  Virtualization has its beginnings in multiprocessing; one computer, 
one operating system, and many applications made way for one computer, many 
operating systems, and many applications [13].   
There are two main types of virtual machine monitors (also called hypervisors): 
traditional sometimes called type one and, hosted or type two. The traditional type has a 
virtual machine monitor running directly on the hardware, and the virtual machines run 
on top of that, as shown in Figure 1.  The hosted virtual machine runs on top of a virtual 
machine monitor (VMM) sometimes called a hypervisor installed in a host operating 
system [11].  This is illustrated in Figure 2. 
 
Figure 1.   Type 1 VMM 
 
Figure 2.   Type 2 VMM 
The VMM is tasked with providing the interface between the virtual machine and either 
the host operating system or the hardware.  It is also responsible for making sure the 
individual virtual machines remain logically separated from one another.   
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There are two main strategies when it comes to virtualization: full virtualization, 
in which the guest operating system is unmodified and the VMM takes care of the 
virtualization, and paravirtualization, in which the guest operating system has been 
modified to make some calls to the VMM instead of running directly on the hardware 
[12].  VMware started with using the full virtualization by doing binary translation of 
privileged instructions on the fly [12].  Xen started with making use of paravirtualization 
to get the operating system and the VMM to work together to provide the virtual interface 
[14].  Both companies are looking at the benefits of both techniques and are working to 
incorporate them into future products.  Full virtualization allows easier portability and 
modularity by allowing any OS to be virtualized.  Paravirtualization can offer significant 
performance improvements since it can eliminate some of the context switching between 
the VMM and the hardware or guest OS [11].   
One of the unique aspects of Xen is that, strictly speaking, Xen is a type one 
virtualization, however Xen makes use of a single privileged virtual machine to manage 
additional, nonprivileged virtual machines [14].  Xen is unique in that one of the VMs is 
closely tied to the VMM in a manner similar to the way that a type two virtualized 
platform places a VMM above the host operating system in order to control 
nonprivileged virtual machines.  Xen breaks VMs up into domains and calls the 
privileged VM Domain 0 or Dom0. Additional virtual machines are the user domains or 
DomUs.  This privileged machine is unique to Xen’s architecture.  VMware does not 
implement its management from a privileged virtual machine. 
Virtualization has many benefits.  A company may run many virtualized servers 
on a single physical machine, and still have the benefit of keeping the services logically 
separated.  With the continued growth of computing power, it is not uncommon for a 
server to have unused processing capacity available.  In many situations, a server may 
only be using a small percentage of its available processing power at any given time; and 
by running multiple virtual machines a server can make more efficient use of its available 




reducing the number of physical boxes required to implement all of the company’s 
computing needs.  This is a major selling point in the push toward cloud computing and 
use of virtualization to provide infrastructure as a service [15].   
The wide spread use of virtualization in data centers has created many concerns 
on the security front.  Collocating many virtual machines on a single physical computer 
changes the security paradigm.  In a nonvirtualized environment, if one server went 
down, then presumably one service went down.  With the move towards highly 
virtualized operations, the loss of a single machine that is hosting multiple virtual servers 
could have a much greater impact [3]. One of the dangers associated with virtualization is 
that an exploit might make it possible for an attacker to escape from one VM and into the 
VMM itself.  Once an attacker has control of the VMM, he effectively has control of 
every virtual machine being controlled by that VMM.  A proof of concept for such a VM 
escape was demonstrated at Black Hat by Kostya Kortchinsky [16].  It may be worth 
noting that the techniques used in this paper may even open a virtual machine up to more 
risk of this type; this remains an open research question [17].   
C. VIRTUAL MACHINE INTROSPECTION 
The use of virtual machine monitors and hypervisors leads directly into virtual 
machine introspection, a term first coined by Garfinkel and Rosenblum [18].  VMI 
leverages the VMM’s unique position as an entity external to the VM and yet able to 
observe all of the VM at a very low level.  Garfinkel and Rosenblum utilized this fact to 
position an intrusion detection system (IDS) at the VMM. This positioning allowed the 
IDS to be in a place that it would not be as susceptible to an attack as many host based 
IDSs are, since it would be outside the host.  It would also allow better visibility into 
what was actually happening on the host than would be available if the IDS was just on 
the network.  This technique has since been extended to perform digital forensics on 
virtual machines [1].  Brian Hay et al. have developed a toolkit called Virtual 
Introspection for Xen (VIX).  They have shown that this toolkit can be used to perform 
live analysis and collect volatile data from a virtual machine.  Their technique involves 
pausing the virtual machine, collecting required data and then resuming the virtual 
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machine.  That research showed that even a compromised machine with a rootkit that was 
hiding it’s presence from traditional user space forensics tools running within the virtual 
machine could still be detected via the use of VMI techniques.  This is because the tools 
that they developed look at the memory on the computer system and don’t rely on system 
calls within the guest operating system to do the analysis.  Since Garfinkel and 
Rosenblum’s initial work, this topic has seen a lot of growth and research.  Other 
researchers [1] have successfully used VMI to collect volatile data off a virtual machine.  
The tools they developed allow an investigator to run the tools from within a Dom0 host 
to perform observations of a DomU host.   Since the Dom0 is running from a privileged 
domain, it can access all of the DomU’s memory, this is what allows the virtual 
introspection to take place.  The Dom0 can map the DomU’s memory into its own 
memory space and then analyze that memory.  This strategy works well when a DomU 
virtual machine that has been compromised.  The investigator can examine it from the 
Dom0 machine and see all of its memory, including things that might be trying to hide 
themselves, such as a kernel level rootkit in the virtual machine.  This is possible because 
the Dom0 can leverage the VMM to obtain a view of the virtual machine that is below 
the kernel running within the virtual machine.  This key piece of research showed how 
virtual machine introspection can give a view that is incredibly helpful to forensic 
examiners, what remained to be shown was further explored in a paper written by Kara 
Nance et al. [17].  They looked at the implications of virtual machine introspection for 
digital forensics, and outlined some of the areas that need to be examined for the potential 
to become fully realized.  The authors outlined four main areas of research to be done: 
the first is VMI tool development, the second is application to nonquiescent machines, 
the third is covert operations using virtual machine introspection, and the last is detection 
of virtual machine introspection from within a virtual machine.  These areas will be 
expanded on in the future work section.   
Another toolset that is similar to VIX is XenAccess developed and maintained by 
Bryan Payne [4].  XenAccess is designed to provide a library of functions to build a 
monitoring architecture.  This incorporates virtual memory introspection to monitor 
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applications and access the memory state of the virtual machine.  This architecture has 
been used to implement VMI, and with that, we can perform forensics on virtual 
machines.   
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III. DESIGN AND METHODOLOGY 
A. ENVIRONMENT 
Our experiments were performed using a Dell Optiplex 755 system with a core 2 
duo processor and four GB of RAM.  We installed CentOS 5.6 x86_64 with Linux kernel 
version number 2.6.18-238.9.1.el5 on the base machine [19].  We then replaced the 
kernel with the Xen kernel version 3.0.3-120.el5_6.2.x86_64.  This was done by using 
the package manager in CentOS, the install required a reboot.  We also edited the 
/boot/menu.lst to boot into the xen kernel by default.  We then used the graphical virtual 
machine editor interface and installed a hardware assisted virtual machine with CentOS 
5.6 x86 32 bit.  The VM was a fully virtualized machine, we did not use the 
paravirtualization option, and this allowed us to install an unmodified operating system 
within a virtual machine.  We kept both the host machine and the guest VM up to date 
with all recommended automatic patches as of June 2011.   
We set up the virtual machine using the Virtual Machine Manager that was 
installed on CentOS.  It allowed us to specify in a GUI what options we wanted to 
include in the virtual machine.  We configured the DomU VM to have one GB of RAM 
and to only have one CPU allocated, while the Dom0 machine was allocated both CPUs.  
This is common among virtualization environments.  Since the Dom0 machine could use 
an extra CPU, it could be looking into memory of the DomU while the DomU was 
currently running.  Both machines could be running on separate cores depending on the 
scheduling.   
The XenAccess package depends on the Xen development library; this was also 
downloaded and installed through the CentOS package manager by installing the package 
xen-devel.  This package includes the header files that XenAccess depends on and uses to 
map memory and copy it from DomU to Dom0.  We downloaded XenAccess version 0.5 




autogen.sh script that comes with XenAccess and ran configure and make.  This built, 
and compiled XenAccess on the Dom0. We then ran a make install as root to install the 
tools on the Dom0 by the tools are installed to the /usr/local/bin/ directory.   
One of the key components to getting XenAccess to work is creating a 
configuration file for the DomU that is going to be examined.  This file will provide the 
information that is necessary for XenAccess to examine the DomU’s memory.  
According to the XenAccess documentation, “This file has a set of entries for each 
domain that XenAccess will access. These entries specify things such as the OS type 
(e.g., Linux or Windows), the location of symbolic information, and offsets used to 
access data within the domain” [21].  We obtained these values using a find offsets tool 
that is included in the XenAccess package.  This tool is a loadable kernel module, 
findoffsets.ko that needs to be run from inside the DomU. Once loaded, the module 
determines the required offset information and logs the values via the syslog facility.  The 
module is loaded using the insmod command after which the necessary offset information 
may be retrieved from the system log file.  We then copied the values and unloaded the 
module.  For our setup, the configuration file looked like this: 
testhvm1 { 
        ostype = "Linux"; 
        sysmap = "/boot/System.map-testhvm1"; 
#       linux_name = 0x194; 
        linux_tasks = 0x7c; 
        linux_mm = 0x84; 
        linux_pid = 0xa8; 
        linux_pgd = 0x28; 
        linux_addr = 0x84; 
} 
In order for this configuration file to work, we had to copy the System.map-2.6.18-
238.9.1.el5 from the DomU and place it in the Dom0 as /boot/System.map-testhvm1.  
The system map is a look-up table that maps kernel symbols to their respective locations 
in memory.   
XenAccess includes six tools that can be used and may be applicable for 
forensics. The first is dump-memory, this tool maps out each page in the DomU’s 
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memory space and copies it into a specified file.  The second is process-list, this tool 
mimics the Unix ps utility and provides the rough equivalent of running ps –A within the 
VM.  The third is module-list, this tool mimics the lsmod utility on the VM. The fourth is 
map-addr, this maps a specified address into the Dom0’s address space to examine.  The 
fifth is map-symbol, this provides a simple view of a specified kernel symbol.  The final 
tool is process-data, this shows the userspace data of a specified process pid. [21] We 
used the first three tools, as we felt that these were representative of tasks that can be 
accomplished by using VMI, and Unix counterparts of these utilities are often useful in 
conducting live system analysis.  The remaining three tools were more specific and we 
felt that the three higher level tools would better show the utility for forensics.   
We logged into both the Dom0 and the DomU machines as root using ssh to run 
our experiments.  The XenAccess toolkit requires root access to run.   
B. METHODOLOGY 
The questions that we wanted to answer were as follows:  do the tools work in a 
nonquiescent environment?  If so, can they give reliable results in that environment?  
What kind of performance do the tools give under differing loads on the VM?  Do the 
tools cause any noticeable degradation in the processing on the VM?   
To answer each of these questions, the following tests were designed and 
performed.  To test if the tools work in a nonquiescent environment, the tools were first 
run on a paused machine and then run again on a nonquiescent machine in order to 
compare the results.  To test how reliable they were in each environment, we compared 
the output from the VMI tools with their Unix counterparts that were run within the 
DomU machine.  To test the performance of the tools, we ran tests under different loads 
on the VM and compared the average time taken to run over ten runs.  To measure the 
degradation in performance happening on the VM, we timed the compiling of the kernel 
without running the tools from the Dom0 and then timed the compiling of the kernel 
while the tools were run from the Dom0.  We also measured the average CPU load across 
the compile for both sets of tests.   
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To help minimize the variables with the experiments, the same saved state was 
loaded before each test.  We ran each test ten times to validate and collect average times 
for each run.  The results of these tests will be covered in the next chapter, and the results 
of each individual test will be available in the appendix.  The tests were run over an ssh 
connection to the Dom0 machine and an ssh connection to the DomU machine for the 
nonquiescent tests against the DomU.  On both machines, we logged in as root to run the 
commands.   
Let us look a little more in depth at the tools that we chose to run for our 
experiments. The memory-dump tool is used to copy the entire memory space of the VM.  
It copies a page at a time from the DomU’s memory space into the Dom0’s memory 
space.  This results in a snapshot of the memory of the DomU.  Process-list makes use of 
the linux_pid value from the system map to walk through each process in the DomU’s 
process list.  Module-list performs in a manner similar to process list but iterates over the 
loaded Linux kernel modules instead of the process list.  Linux kernel modules are 
additional components of the operating system that are dynamically loaded into the 
running kernel.   
We tested each of these tools to observe how much having the VM in a paused 
state would affect the reliability of the tools.  Specifically, we were interested in 
determining whether the tools would only be able to collect useable data when the VM 
was in a quiescent state, or whether the same data be obtained while in a nonquiescent 
state?  Following the procedure outlined earlier, the tests that we performed were to 
pause the VM, and then run the VMI process list, module list, and memory dump.  This 
would give us a baseline with which to compare the other results.  We would also test the 
tools while in the nonquiescent state.  Since the performance of the tools could vary 
based on the loading of the system being examined, we tested the tools while the machine 
was in a state close to idle (i.e., just background processes running), and while the 
machine was heavily loaded (i.e., compiling the Linux kernel).  The tools provided us 
with a dump of memory, a list of processes, and a list of loaded kernel modules.  
Additional processing of the memory dump for forensic purposes was out of scope for 
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this research.  A number of programs are capable of analyzing memory dumps, such as 
Volatility [9] or IDETECT [10].  These tools, and other methods, have been documented 
in other papers [22], [23].   
We established a baseline snapshot of the DomU virtual machine that was loaded 
prior to each test.  We booted up the system and then used the save state menu option to 
save this “start” state.  We then rolled back the DomU state using this saved snapshot for 
each subsequent test.  This allowed us to have some assurance that each test was being 
performed on a nearly identical system.  This will also allow for repeatability of the 
experiments.   
Before testing the tools in a nonquiescent environment, we ran the tools to make 
sure they worked while the machine was paused to obtain a baseline dataset to compare 
to our results.  We started up the machine using the saved snapshot then logged in and 
launched the same processes that we would be using for the nonquiescent tests; however, 
we paused the machine before running any analysis tools from Dom0.  Using the tools, 
we obtained a memory dump, a process list, and a module list.  The results we obtained 
from the tools that were run while the DomU VM was paused confirmed the results of 
previous work, [1] namely that VMI can be performed on a paused VM.  We also 
reverted to our snapshot and ran the equivalent Unix process list and module list tools 
inside the VM.  This allowed us to compare the results obtained from the VMI tools 
running against a paused VM with the results of tools running within the actual VM.  The 
results were the same (excepting the presence of the ps process itself which was to be 
expected).  We did not repeat the work done in [1] in which they test the ability for VMI 
to detect the presence of a rootkit that caused the results of the ps process run from inside 
the VM and the ps VMI utility to be different.   
We decided to have the virtual machine in a state close to idle for our first set of 
experiments.  Since there would be little activity on the machine, we expected little 
variation in the observed process list.  In this low utilization state, the CPU utilization 
according to the System Monitor was approximately two percent.  Having a light load 
minimized the number of changes that were taking place in RAM.   
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For the next set of tests, we tasked the virtual machine with compiling the linux 
kernel to simulate a heavier load on the virtual machine and then perform the same tests 
and observe the results.  We also ran the top utility in batch mode to collect the average 
CPU load throughout the compile.  We used a script to start top, time the make of the 
kernel and then kill top.  After averaging the CPU load across all ten runs of the 
experiment, we found that when we did not run the VMI the average CPU utilization over 
the compile of the kernel was 69.4%.  When we did run the VMI the average CPU usage 
was 68.6%.  We attribute this change to the Dom0 using the CPU and will further 
investigate this in the results section.  During this experiment, we also measured how 
long it took to compile the kernel, we did this with the time command.   
We also timed how long the VMI operations required to complete from the Dom0 
during each test that we ran.  This was to measure how the tools performed and how the 
load on the system affected that performance.  The results of this will be presented in the 
results section.   
The goal of creating a lightly loaded test case and heavily loaded test case was to 
observe whether the XenAccess tools work just as well in each case, or whether there are 
major problems with attempting to use VMI on a nonquiescent VM.  We were also able 
to measure the performance of the tools this way. We recognize that there are many 
different types of load on a system, we took the generic case of high CPU utilization, but 
we could have tested it with a different type of load.   
We wanted to keep in mind that with a forensic examination the integrity of the 
data is of the upmost importance.  If it can be shown that not pausing the virtual machine 
does not affect the collection of data by means of virtual machine introspection, then it 
can potentially speed up the collection process.  It would also allow VMI to be more 
useable for the purposes of system monitoring as outlined in [4].   
XenAccess uses the Xen control library to provide access to the memory pages 




programs to provide memory introspection. It should be pointed out that while this thesis 
focused on CentOS, the techniques and programs run could be used to analyze any type 
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IV. RESULTS AND CONCLUSION 
A. RESULTS  
With the testing environment configured as outlined in the previous section, we 
began our experiments by testing a lightly loaded system both in a quiescent state and a 
nonquiescent state.  After running the tests while the virtual machine was paused, we 
obtained a baseline for how the tests should go.  The baseline tests consisted of collecting 
a memory dump, a process list, and a module list from the paused DomU VM.  This data 
was then compared against the output of corresponding Unix utilities executed inside the 
virtual machine.  The process list and module list were found to match (with the 
exception of the ps process appearing in the process list collected within the running 
DomU).  The full listing of the processes and modules is included in the Appendix.  This 
demonstrated that while the machine was paused the XenAccess tools can obtain useful 
forensic data.   
For the tests that were conducted on a lightly loaded system, the average CPU 
load for the duration of the light load test was approximately 2% according to the activity 
monitor that we had running on the virtual machine.  This test was initiated from the 
same snapshot VM state used in all of the testing. For this test, the same data (memory, 
process list, module list) was collected from the DomU.  For each of the ten runs of the 
test, the process list and module list matched exactly the process list and module list 
collected from the paused test.  We tested the difference in the data collected by using the 
diff program; this allowed us to see the locations in the data that differed.   
Since the Dom0 maps out a page of memory by copying the page from the 
DomU’s address space and placing it into its own address space, the page may currently 
be in use by the VM, so it is possible that the page changes in the VM right after it is 
copied into Dom0 so that the pages in Dom0 and DomU become different.  This change 
is negligible from our perspective because the Dom0 page represents a moment in time 
snapshot of the corresponding DomU page.  In the worst case scenario, it is possible that 
each DomU page is changed directly after it is copied.  Even in this worst case scenario, 
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useable forensic data is obtained; however, this scenario is extremely unlikely.  The same 
issues exist when performing live forensics analysis on a physical machine, and this has 
been deemed an acceptable risk in many cases [24].   
The second test involved a heavily loaded system. To generate a heavy load, we 
started compiling a Linux kernel within the DomU VM and reran the tests.  We ran a 
baseline test of compiling the Linux kernel without performing any VMI.  The average 
results of the time it took to compile are listed in Table 1.  We again performed the tests 
for ten runs on both a paused system and while the system was still running.  The results 
differed between the paused test and the running test; however, the results differed 
because it was not possible for us to capture the exact same moment during the execution 
of the process.  The differences in the process list reflected that there were different make 
and gcc processes running which reflects the state of the machine, so it can be shown that 
although these results did not match each other the results that were collected from the 
running machine still likely reflected the state of the machine at the time they were run.   
 
Real Time User Time System Time 
Average 19:25.756 13:31.953 04:50.774 
max 19:57.014 13:33.519 04:55.958 
min 19:00.883 13:30.209 04:44.206 
Standard 
deviation 00:16.998 00:01.080 00:03.321 
Table 1.   Time to compile kernel without VMI 
For the heavily loaded system, we ran top during the compile.  This allowed us to 
collect data on the CPU utilization while the kernel was compiling.  When we did not run 
the VMI utilities, the average CPU usage over the ten runs was 69.4%.  The average CPU 
usage when we performed the VMI over the ten runs was 68.6%.  This difference is 
likely due to the contention on the Dom0 trying to use the CPU.  Since the Dom0 has 
access to both CPUs and the DomU only has access to one, things running on the Dom0 
could kick the DomU process out.  We observed that during the top trace of the process, 
the CPU utilization drops significantly during the time when the actual VMI memory 
dump is taking place.  This could be due to caching issues or the VMI process running on 
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the Dom0.  It could also be that while the DomU system was blocking for I/O it was 
blocked longer than it would have been otherwise, and this has driven down the CPU 
utilization rates.   
It is also the case here that since there are many changes happening in RAM, and 
data is being modified and moved around, the snapshot of memory will be different if 
done multiple times.  This is the same behavior that we would see if we were to pause the 
VM and take a snapshot, then unpause, and allow processing to continue for a brief time 
and then pause and take another snapshot.   
We looked at the time that it took the kernel to compile both while we were not 
doing VMI and how long it took for it to compile while doing VMI at the same time.  
This was done using the time command.  The results are given in Table 1 and 2.  This 
shows, on average, there is a potentially noticeable increase in time taken when the VMI 
is performed while the kernel is compiling, however this difference is still eclipsed by the 
length of the compile.  This increase in time could potentially be exploited by software 
running inside the VM and be used to detect if VMI is being performed.  We hypothesize 
that this increase in time is due to the cache being flushed on the processor, since during 
VMI each page is copied and mapped into the Dom0 and since Dom0 can control both 
processors, it is likely that all of that information is flushing out the cache.  This flushing 
out of cache could provide a more consistent snapshot of memory since the information 
in cache will be written out to memory as it is replaced by the Dom0 process information.  
We leave the testing of this hypothesis to future work.  It should also be noted, however, 
that the increase in time taken does not necessarily mean that VMI is happening; it could 
just mean that the Dom0 machine is experiencing a larger load.  It could be that any large 
process on the Dom0 would cause a similar reaction in the DomU.  More research is 
necessary before conclusions can be drawn on this; we recommend that experiments be 






Real Time User Time System Time 
Average 19:45.538 13:33.098 04:51.309 
max 19:54.454 13:34.288 04:58.869 
min 19:37.980 13:31.768 04:47.969 
Standard 
deviation 00:04.738 00:00.898 00:03.347 
Table 2.   Time to compile kernel with VMI 
We also tested how long the VMI memory dump took under the different loads.  
The results of this test are shown in Figure 3.  The average time it took for the memory 
dump on a quiescent machine was 6.975 seconds.  The average time it took on a machine 
with a light load was 7.021 seconds.  On a heavy loaded system, it took on average 9.068 
seconds.  This is a substantial difference.  This difference is most likely due to the load 
on the CPU and the Dom0 has competition for the other CPU during the Heavy load, 
whereas for the light load and for the paused machine there are not many other processes 
to compete with it.   
 
Figure 3.   Time taken for VMI memory dump utility to run with different loads 
Based on these results, it appears that using VMI on a running VM does not 
inhibit the opportunity to perform forensics on the VM.   
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B. CONCLUSION 
Our experimental results suggest that forensics may be performed on a 
nonquiescent virtual machine with what appears to be the same quality as on a paused 
VM.  That being said, when there is an incident, the argument for allowing the system 
being investigated to continue running should be a compelling one as it almost certainly 
best to pause the virtual machine in order to contain the damage and stop the intrusion or 
incident.  That may not be the goal of the investigation, and it may be to observe and 
document the intrusion along the way, in which case pausing the VM would not be the 
best action.  Our results show that useful data can then be collected even while the VM is 
under heavy load.   
VMI on a nonquiescent VM is very similar to doing live analysis on a physical 
machine.  There will be the same sort of issues with collecting a memory dump while a 
machine is running whether it is virtual or not.  With VMI, however, obtaining the data 
may be less observable than using the tools installed within the VM itself, and so will 
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V. RELATED AND FUTURE WORK 
A. RELATED WORK 
There is some related research going on in virtual machine introspection, and 
much research that can still be done.  For this project, we initially looked at using vprobes 
by vmware [25].  This product is advertised as a stethoscope for your virtual machine.  It 
is geared towards problems that may be occurring within the virtualization layer and 
investigating those problems to troubleshoot issues in the vmm while running.  While this 
is very similar to what we are doing, it is, fundamentally, a different problem set.  Since 
VMware products are proprietary software, their source code is unavailable, and we were 
not able to adapt vprobes to our purposes and chose to investigate other options.  Since 
Xen is open source, it is much easier to adapt the tools to work in the required 
environment.  With some work, vprobes could probably be changed to allow the 
collection of forensics data.   
Another project that focuses on Xen is from a group at the University of Alaska 
called Virtual Introspection for Xen or VIX [1].  This project was developed to be able to 
perform virtual machine introspection in Xen much like XenAccess does.  It works by 
pausing the virtual machine and then collecting the data in a similar way as XenAccess.  
We were unable to test its applications to nonquiescent virtual machines but hypothesize 
that it would yield similar results as XenAccess.   
On the line of the VMI tool development research recommended by [17], a new 
paper has been presented on Virtuoso [26] that presents an easier way to develop tools 
that can use VMI by first writing the tool in the guest, and then it can automatically port 
it to a VMI tool.   
B. FUTURE WORK 
This thesis focused on Xen, but there are many other virtualization platforms 
available.  We hypothesize that these concepts will carry over to other platforms, but we 
leave the testing of this hypothesis to future work.   
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There is also much work that can be done in virtual machine introspection.  As 
mentioned earlier: tool development, detection of VMI, and the use of VMI for covert 
operations, such as implementing a honey pot type environment [27], and monitoring it 
using VMI, are some of the areas that can be further explored.  The tools in this area are 
not as mature as they need to be for wide use.  While the XenAccess toolkit is built with 
the idea that it will be expanded and brought to maturity, this has not happened yet, and 
although releasing it as an open source project has fostered some development, more can 
be done, such as expanding the toolset to provide more utilities to the investigator.   
In the nonquiescent environment, there are more experiments we would have 
liked to perform that time did not allow.  We would have liked to be able to test other 
operating systems, especially a windows environment.  The XenAccess tools should 
allow for an easy migration to testing other environments.  We were able to test the 
selected tools under a high CPU load, but it would have been interesting to see how the 
tools performed under other types of loads also, such as an I/O bound process.  We were 
also able to test how the tools changed the processing time for compiling the kernel, it 
would be interesting to see how much the VMI affected a process whose processing time 
was closer to the time that the VMI process itself took.  This would provide a better 
understanding of just how noticeable the VMI process is from within the VM.   
There are also implications for being able to detect VMI from within the VM.  As 
we mentioned in the results, we observed that the process took longer and had less CPU 
utilization on average over the course of the process.  It is probably the case that this 
would only be indicative of the fact that virtualization is happening, but it remains to be 
seen how much VMI affects performance on the VM; especially when the VMI is done 
on a nonquiescent machine.  The use of tools, such as Xen Access, could affect the ability 
of the virtual machine to detect the presence of virtual machine introspection, but that is 




Selected output from the experiments. 
A. OUTPUT FROM PAUSED PS LIST 
[    1] init 
[    2] migration/0 
[    3] ksoftirqd/0 
[    4] watchdog/0 
[    5] events/0 
[    6] khelper 
[    7] kthread 
[   10] kblockd/0 
[   11] kacpid 
[   57] cqueue/0 
[   60] khubd 
[   62] kseriod 
[  125] khungtaskd 
[  126] pdflush 
[  127] pdflush 
[  128] kswapd0 
[  129] aio/0 
[  284] kpsmoused 
[  308] ata/0 
[  309] ata_aux 
[  314] kstriped 
[  323] ksnapd 
[  334] kjournald 
[  365] kauditd 
[  398] udevd 
[  639] xenwatch 
[  640] xenbus 
[ 1162] kmpathd/0 
[ 1163] kmpath_handlerd 
[ 1220] kjournald 
[ 1403] iscsi_eh 
[ 1442] ib_addr 
[ 1449] ib_mcast 
[ 1450] ib_inform 
[ 1451] local_sa 
[ 1454] iw_cm_wq 
[ 1457] ib_cm/0 
[ 1460] rdma_cm 
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[ 1476] brcm_iscsiuio 
[ 1481] iscsid 
[ 1482] iscsid 
[ 1568] mcstransd 
[ 1809] dhclient 
[ 1861] auditd 
[ 1863] audispd 
[ 1885] restorecond 
[ 1899] syslogd 
[ 1902] klogd 
[ 1992] portmap 
[ 2023] rpciod/0 
[ 2029] rpc.statd 
[ 2063] rpc.idmapd 
[ 2088] dbus-daemon 
[ 2103] hcid 
[ 2107] sdpd 
[ 2126] krfcommd 
[ 2173] pcscd 
[ 2188] acpid 
[ 2207] hald 
[ 2208] hald-runner 
[ 2215] hald-addon-acpi 
[ 2220] hald-addon-keyb 
[ 2229] hald-addon-stor 
[ 2250] hidd 
[ 2293] automount 
[ 2315] hpiod 
[ 2320] hpssd.py 
[ 2340] sshd 
[ 2356] cupsd 
[ 2387] sendmail 
[ 2398] sendmail 
[ 2413] gpm 
[ 2427] crond 
[ 2461] xfs 
[ 2488] atd 
[ 2530] avahi-daemon 
[ 2531] avahi-daemon 
[ 2566] smartd 
[ 2570] mingetty 
[ 2571] mingetty 
[ 2574] mingetty 
[ 2577] mingetty 
[ 2578] mingetty 
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[ 2579] mingetty 
[ 2590] gdm-binary 
[ 2656] gdm-binary 
[ 2658] gdm-rh-security 
[ 2661] Xorg 
[ 2673] yum-updatesd 
[ 2675] gam_server 
[ 2686] gnome-session 
[ 2722] ssh-agent 
[ 2751] dbus-launch 
[ 2752] dbus-daemon 
[ 2759] gconfd-2 
[ 2762] gnome-keyring-d 
[ 2764] gnome-settings- 
[ 2780] xrdb 
[ 2784] metacity 
[ 2788] gnome-panel 
[ 2790] nautilus 
[ 2794] bonobo-activati 
[ 2797] gnome-vfs-daemo 
[ 2799] eggcups 
[ 2800] gnome-volume-ma 
[ 2809] bt-applet 
[ 2824] puplet 
[ 2828] nm-applet 
[ 2830] wnck-applet 
[ 2832] trashapplet 
[ 2835] pam-panel-icon 
[ 2836] pam_timestamp_c 
[ 2838] gnome-power-man 
[ 2840] escd 
[ 2852] nm-system-setti 
[ 2854] mixer_applet2 
[ 2857] mapping-daemon 
[ 2858] yum-updatesd-he 
[ 2862] notification-ar 
[ 2864] clock-applet 
[ 2887] gnome-terminal 
[ 2889] gnome-pty-helpe 
[ 2890] bash 
[ 2908] gnome-system-mo 
[ 2911] gnome-screensav 
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B. OUTPUT FROM LIGHT LOAD PS LIST 
[    1] init 
[    2] migration/0 
[    3] ksoftirqd/0 
[    4] watchdog/0 
[    5] events/0 
[    6] khelper 
[    7] kthread 
[   10] kblockd/0 
[   11] kacpid 
[   57] cqueue/0 
[   60] khubd 
[   62] kseriod 
[  125] khungtaskd 
[  126] pdflush 
[  127] pdflush 
[  128] kswapd0 
[  129] aio/0 
[  284] kpsmoused 
[  308] ata/0 
[  309] ata_aux 
[  314] kstriped 
[  323] ksnapd 
[  334] kjournald 
[  365] kauditd 
[  398] udevd 
[  639] xenwatch 
[  640] xenbus 
[ 1162] kmpathd/0 
[ 1163] kmpath_handlerd 
[ 1220] kjournald 
[ 1403] iscsi_eh 
[ 1442] ib_addr 
[ 1449] ib_mcast 
[ 1450] ib_inform 
[ 1451] local_sa 
[ 1454] iw_cm_wq 
[ 1457] ib_cm/0 
[ 1460] rdma_cm 
[ 1476] brcm_iscsiuio 
[ 1481] iscsid 
[ 1482] iscsid 
[ 1568] mcstransd 
[ 1809] dhclient 
[ 1861] auditd 
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[ 1863] audispd 
[ 1885] restorecond 
[ 1899] syslogd 
[ 1902] klogd 
[ 1992] portmap 
[ 2023] rpciod/0 
[ 2029] rpc.statd 
[ 2063] rpc.idmapd 
[ 2088] dbus-daemon 
[ 2103] hcid 
[ 2107] sdpd 
[ 2126] krfcommd 
[ 2173] pcscd 
[ 2188] acpid 
[ 2207] hald 
[ 2208] hald-runner 
[ 2215] hald-addon-acpi 
[ 2220] hald-addon-keyb 
[ 2229] hald-addon-stor 
[ 2250] hidd 
[ 2293] automount 
[ 2315] hpiod 
[ 2320] hpssd.py 
[ 2340] sshd 
[ 2356] cupsd 
[ 2387] sendmail 
[ 2398] sendmail 
[ 2413] gpm 
[ 2427] crond 
[ 2461] xfs 
[ 2488] atd 
[ 2530] avahi-daemon 
[ 2531] avahi-daemon 
[ 2566] smartd 
[ 2570] mingetty 
[ 2571] mingetty 
[ 2574] mingetty 
[ 2577] mingetty 
[ 2578] mingetty 
[ 2579] mingetty 
[ 2590] gdm-binary 
[ 2656] gdm-binary 
[ 2658] gdm-rh-security 
[ 2661] Xorg 
[ 2673] yum-updatesd 
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[ 2675] gam_server 
[ 2686] gnome-session 
[ 2722] ssh-agent 
[ 2751] dbus-launch 
[ 2752] dbus-daemon 
[ 2759] gconfd-2 
[ 2762] gnome-keyring-d 
[ 2764] gnome-settings- 
[ 2780] xrdb 
[ 2784] metacity 
[ 2788] gnome-panel 
[ 2790] nautilus 
[ 2794] bonobo-activati 
[ 2797] gnome-vfs-daemo 
[ 2799] eggcups 
[ 2800] gnome-volume-ma 
[ 2809] bt-applet 
[ 2824] puplet 
[ 2828] nm-applet 
[ 2830] wnck-applet 
[ 2832] trashapplet 
[ 2835] pam-panel-icon 
[ 2836] pam_timestamp_c 
[ 2838] gnome-power-man 
[ 2840] escd 
[ 2852] nm-system-setti 
[ 2854] mixer_applet2 
[ 2857] mapping-daemon 
[ 2858] yum-updatesd-he 
[ 2862] notification-ar 
[ 2864] clock-applet 
[ 2887] gnome-terminal 
[ 2889] gnome-pty-helpe 
[ 2890] bash 
[ 2908] gnome-system-mo 
[ 2911] gnome-screensav 
[ 3560] sshd 
[ 3564] bash 
C. EXAMPLE OUTPUT FROM HEAVY LOAD PS LIST  
[    1] init 
[    2] migration/0 
[    3] ksoftirqd/0 
[    4] watchdog/0 
[    5] events/0 
 33 
[    6] khelper 
[    7] kthread 
[   10] kblockd/0 
[   11] kacpid 
[   57] cqueue/0 
[   60] khubd 
[   62] kseriod 
[  125] khungtaskd 
[  126] pdflush 
[  127] pdflush 
[  128] kswapd0 
[  129] aio/0 
[  284] kpsmoused 
[  308] ata/0 
[  309] ata_aux 
[  314] kstriped 
[  323] ksnapd 
[  334] kjournald 
[  365] kauditd 
[  398] udevd 
[  639] xenwatch 
[  640] xenbus 
[ 1162] kmpathd/0 
[ 1163] kmpath_handlerd 
[ 1220] kjournald 
[ 1403] iscsi_eh 
[ 1442] ib_addr 
[ 1449] ib_mcast 
[ 1450] ib_inform 
[ 1451] local_sa 
[ 1454] iw_cm_wq 
[ 1457] ib_cm/0 
[ 1460] rdma_cm 
[ 1476] brcm_iscsiuio 
[ 1481] iscsid 
[ 1482] iscsid 
[ 1568] mcstransd 
[ 1809] dhclient 
[ 1861] auditd 
[ 1863] audispd 
[ 1885] restorecond 
[ 1899] syslogd 
[ 1902] klogd 
[ 1992] portmap 
[ 2023] rpciod/0 
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[ 2029] rpc.statd 
[ 2063] rpc.idmapd 
[ 2088] dbus-daemon 
[ 2103] hcid 
[ 2107] sdpd 
[ 2126] krfcommd 
[ 2173] pcscd 
[ 2188] acpid 
[ 2207] hald 
[ 2208] hald-runner 
[ 2215] hald-addon-acpi 
[ 2220] hald-addon-keyb 
[ 2229] hald-addon-stor 
[ 2250] hidd 
[ 2293] automount 
[ 2315] hpiod 
[ 2320] hpssd.py 
[ 2340] sshd 
[ 2356] cupsd 
[ 2387] sendmail 
[ 2398] sendmail 
[ 2413] gpm 
[ 2427] crond 
[ 2461] xfs 
[ 2488] atd 
[ 2530] avahi-daemon 
[ 2531] avahi-daemon 
[ 2566] smartd 
[ 2570] mingetty 
[ 2571] mingetty 
[ 2574] mingetty 
[ 2577] mingetty 
[ 2578] mingetty 
[ 2579] mingetty 
[ 2590] gdm-binary 
[ 2656] gdm-binary 
[ 2658] gdm-rh-security 
[ 2661] Xorg 
[ 2673] yum-updatesd 
[ 2675] gam_server 
[ 2686] gnome-session 
[ 2722] ssh-agent 
[ 2751] dbus-launch 
[ 2752] dbus-daemon 
[ 2759] gconfd-2 
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[ 2762] gnome-keyring-d 
[ 2764] gnome-settings- 
[ 2780] xrdb 
[ 2784] metacity 
[ 2788] gnome-panel 
[ 2790] nautilus 
[ 2794] bonobo-activati 
[ 2797] gnome-vfs-daemo 
[ 2799] eggcups 
[ 2800] gnome-volume-ma 
[ 2809] bt-applet 
[ 2824] puplet 
[ 2828] nm-applet 
[ 2830] wnck-applet 
[ 2832] trashapplet 
[ 2835] pam-panel-icon 
[ 2836] pam_timestamp_c 
[ 2838] gnome-power-man 
[ 2840] escd 
[ 2852] nm-system-setti 
[ 2854] mixer_applet2 
[ 2857] mapping-daemon 
[ 2858] yum-updatesd-he 
[ 2862] notification-ar 
[ 2864] clock-applet 
[ 2887] gnome-terminal 
[ 2889] gnome-pty-helpe 
[ 2890] bash 
[ 2908] gnome-system-mo 
[ 2911] gnome-screensav 
[ 3560] sshd 
[ 3564] bash 
[ 3594] top 
[ 3595] make 
[ 6732] make 
[ 7408] make 
[ 7532] sh 
[ 7533] gcc 
[ 7534] cc1 
[ 7535] as 

































































































E. SCRIPT USED TO START HEAVY LOAD TESTS 
#!/bin/sh 
top –b –i > cpu_stats.txt & 
cd /tmp/linux-2.6.18 
time make 
pkill -9 top 
F. TABLES OF TIMING RESULTS 
 
Run Real time User time System time 
1 19:09.727 13:30.209 04:47.802 
2 19:22.446 13:31.628 04:53.119 
3 19:26.606 13:32.612 04:51.577 
4 19:19.343 13:32.086 04:48.875 
5 19:24.444 13:32.251 04:50.683 
6 19:27.535 13:31.921 04:52.675 
7 19:51.013 13:33.223 04:49.663 
8 19:00.883 13:30.309 04:44.206 
9 19:18.545 13:31.769 04:53.184 
10 19:57.014 13:33.519 04:55.958 
Average 19:25.756 13:31.953 04:50.774 
max 19:57.014 13:33.519 04:55.958 
min 19:00.883 13:30.209 04:44.206 
stddev 00:16.998 00:01.080 00:03.321 
Table 3.   Time for make without VMI 
Run Real time User time System time 
1 19:37.980 13:31.768 04:47.969 
2 19:45.182 13:33.126 04:47.978 
3 19:42.589 13:31.872 04:49.999 
4 19:47.298 13:33.748 04:54.179 
5 19:41.504 13:33.380 04:48.171 
6 19:50.110 13:33.487 04:52.151 
7 19:42.522 13:32.383 04:51.950 
8 19:54.454 13:34.218 04:58.869 
9 19:45.519 13:32.713 04:51.213 
10 19:48.221 13:34.288 04:50.613 
Average 19:45.538 13:33.098 04:51.309 
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max 19:54.454 13:34.288 04:58.869 
min 19:37.980 13:31.768 04:47.969 
stddev 00:04.738 00:00.898 00:03.347 
Table 4.   Time for make with VMI 
Run Real time User time System time 
1 00:08.273 00:00.660 00:04.804 
2 00:09.024 00:00.692 00:04.468 
3 00:09.000 00:00.684 00:04.908 
4 00:09.156 00:00.864 00:04.652 
5 00:09.766 00:00.692 00:04.980 
6 00:09.766 00:00.980 00:04.840 
7 00:09.478 00:00.860 00:04.708 
8 00:09.550 00:00.884 00:04.932 
9 00:09.073 00:00.824 00:04.712 
10 00:07.595 00:00.628 00:05.012 
Average 00:09.068 00:00.777 00:04.802 
max 00:09.766 00:00.980 00:05.012 
min 00:07.595 00:00.628 00:04.468 
stddev 00:00.682 00:00.119 00:00.169 
Table 5.   Time for VMI memory dump on heavy load 
Run Real time User time System time 
1 00:06.974 00:00.644 00:05.084 
2 00:07.353 00:00.692 00:05.140 
3 00:06.650 00:00.656 00:05.144 
4 00:07.082 00:00.756 00:04.964 
5 00:06.695 00:00.756 00:05.028 
6 00:07.157 00:00.648 00:05.312 
7 00:06.524 00:00.760 00:05.036 
8 00:07.464 00:00.536 00:05.192 
9 00:07.082 00:00.780 00:05.204 
10 00:07.232 00:00.828 00:04.984 
Average 00:07.021 00:00.706 00:05.109 
max 00:07.464 00:00.828 00:05.312 
min 00:06.524 00:00.536 00:04.964 
stddev 00:00.311 00:00.086 00:00.110 
Table 6.   Time for VMI memory dump on light load 
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Run Real time User time System time 
1 00:07.968 00:00.652 00:05.032 
2 00:06.635 00:00.688 00:05.080 
3 00:06.674 00:00.688 00:05.116 
4 00:07.082 00:00.756 00:04.964 
5 00:06.521 00:00.804 00:04.960 
6 00:06.805 00:00.748 00:05.004 
7 00:06.688 00:00.740 00:05.096 
8 00:06.884 00:00.640 00:05.180 
9 00:06.467 00:00.692 00:04.880 
10 00:08.027 00:00.720 00:05.184 
Average 00:06.975 00:00.713 00:05.050 
max 00:08.027 00:00.804 00:05.184 
min 00:06.467 00:00.640 00:04.880 
stddev 00:00.567 00:00.050 00:00.099 
Table 7.   Time for VMI memory dump on quiescent light load 
Run Real time User time System time 
1 00:06.735 00:00.596 00:05.128 
2 00:06.379 00:00.644 00:05.044 
3 00:06.419 00:00.736 00:04.792 
4 00:06.407 00:00.784 00:05.016 
5 00:06.868 00:00.660 00:05.128 
6 00:06.901 00:00.604 00:05.160 
7 00:06.617 00:00.728 00:05.032 
8 00:07.057 00:00.512 00:05.292 
9 00:06.727 00:00.552 00:05.224 
10 00:06.160 00:00.560 00:05.024 
Average 00:06.627 00:00.638 00:05.084 
max 00:07.057 00:00.784 00:05.292 
min 00:06.160 00:00.512 00:04.792 
stddev 00:00.281 00:00.089 00:00.138 
Table 8.   Time for VMI memory dump on quiescent heavy load 
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